1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
~~AF12~~ AF12

631 the resources of the primary economic area,
175 China did not again experience a protracted
433 period of disunity until the Taiping Rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century. Though free from the risks and losses of ocean transport and less vulnerable to pirate raids along the coast, the inland waterway was increasingly costly to operate and maintain. This fact and the military danger of over-reliance of the capital on the South for grain induced the Yüan, Ming, and Ch'ing dynasties to attempt development of the Hui River area near Peking by the construction of additional irrigation systems. The productive results of the projects never came up to expectations, however, because the climate and soil of the area were unfavorable.[15]

441 During the same period in Shansi,
175 individual initiative developed numerous similar
[312] hydraulic works in the province. Such private
[471] activity was uncommon in China and seems to
[565] have been an outgrowth of the relatively high
[438] degree of commercial development in Shansi.[16] The rise of a merchant class in the province began with the Shansi people's participation in trade with the Mongol nomads at state-regulated markets, established on the frontier

15. Ibid., p. 144.
16. Ibid., p. 144.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
~~AF12~~ AF12

648 redress for the incident the Chinese government's execution of sixteen Chinese and the banishment of over thirty others, including two local officials who had been lax in maintaining peace and order.

D. The Boxer Rebellion

648 A more violent and bloody manifestation
● 471 of anti-foreignism occurred in 1900 after
177 Germany, England, Russia, and France had wrung from the dynasty leases of territory and privileges of exploitation on Chinese soil. This display of imperial weakness in 1898, preceded a few months earlier by Tz'u Hsi's deposition of the emperor and the crushing of the reform movement, aroused as much sentiment against the Manchus as against the West. In the North, however, the dynasty was able to turn the expression of resentment almost wholly against the foreigners, particularly Christians, and Chinese converts.

171 Anti-foreign hatred and violence
579 initially reached greatest intensity in Shantung and coalesced in the I Ho T'uan (Righteous Harmony Corps), also called the I Ho Ch'üan (The Fists of Righteous Harmony). Known to the West as the Boxers, the membership of the movement not only had gentry leadership, but also were encouraged by the Manchu governor of Shantung, Yü-hsien. His dismissal

668 in indoctrination, propaganda, and other activities. Still another clue to domestic unrest may be detected from the regime's admission of popular resistance to implementation of the marriage law and the consequent necessity of making the reorientation of marriage and family practices a long-term and continuing task. From such clues to restiveness in the population and from our knowledg of human reaction to excessive regimentation, the casues and pattern of public discontent and tension can be treated with some accuracy.

A. Public Discontent

668 471 The Communists' regimentation of the people and all their activities is a primary cause of resistance and discontent among the populace. The establishment of agricultural producers' co-operatives in the rural districts and the organization of all workers into unions are notable examples of attempts to achieve complete control.

The restrictions resulting from regimentation cause great inconveience. However, the demand that spare-time be deovted entirely to various Party-inspired activities and duties is even more objectionable. Peasants are required to attend meetings, go to winter schools, keep advised of all farm matters, and perform various other duties depending upon the sex and age of the individual. Even how the farmers spend their money is circumscribed by Party counseling. Advice on the disposition of his excess cash is imparted by a Party member in a series of interviews heavily spiked with propaganda. The

668
477 process is not only time-consuming but also trying on the collective patience of the peasants.

City dwellers are forced to accept similar restrictions. On the job, workers are required to observe "labor discipline." They are severely punished for tardiness or for leaving the factory early. Loafing and belligerence are punishable crimes. During off-hours, workers are required to participate in all organizational and cultural activities and attend technical and cultural classes. Participation in mass meetings, propaganda discussion groups, and urban community committees is expected.

B. High Taxation and Public Obligation

651
668 The high taxes and many business restrictions imposed by the Communist regime are likewise unpopular. In the rural districts, the Communist San Ting policy, formulated at the end of 1953, is a measure to tax and to restrict the production, purchasing, and marketing of farm produce. The forced sale of surplus products-- mainly rice and cotton-- at a central, government-controlled market has created great resentment among the peasantry. Urban businesses are subject to a similar scheme of taxation and control. Businessmen must pay high taxes, purchase bonds, and make regular "voluntary contributions" to government-sponsored organizations.

668
653 Public obligations imposed upon the people are a further cause of public discontent.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China AF12



[Facing p. 718--A]

/35 deposit, and that Hopei's iron ore reserve was now second only to that of Manchuria.[7]

II. BASIS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

In spite of certain deficiencies, the two North China provinces possess the basic natural resources for industrial development, viz., coal and iron, in relative abundance. In addition, Hopei's salt fields and large cotton production are especially favorable to the development of the chemical and textile industries.

• 471 Nor should one overlook the historical background which has contributed to industrial development in this area. The role of Tientsin as a major treaty port, followed by its intensive development under the Japanese, led to the establishment of certain industrial enterprises in the Tientsin-Peking-Tangshan triangle prior to the ascendancy of the Communists. In the province of Shansi, on the other hand, a nucleus of heavy industries was formed under the former warlord and provincial governor, Yen Hsi-shan, who was intent on building up the economy of Shansi in the period before the war with Japan.

Given such a historical setting and physical background, it is only natural for the Communist regime to regard North China as a major area for industrial development. By developing North

---

[7] Ching-chi Chou-pao [Economic Weekly], Shanghai, No. 15, April 1953, p. 3.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China AF12

471 China intensively, the Communists apparently hope to establish not only an industrial base this side of the Great Wall both to complement and to balance the industrial redoubt that is Manchuria, but also to furnish an advance base for the exploitation of the potential of the reputedly fabulous Northwest. Since the political center of gravity of Communist China now rests in North China, this economic reasoning would appear to be in line with the Communists' political thinking.

III. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS UNDER THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

185 The relative weight given to North China in industrial development may be seen in some of the construction projects scheduled under Communist China's First Five-Year Plan. According to one survey, which lists 144 construction projects other than the cotton textile industry and some of the coal mines, 12 major constructions are credited to North China, second only to Manchuria's 95, which represent the lion's share.[8] These projects include the Lung-yen iron mine, the Kailan, Ta-t'ung, and Feng-feng coal mines, power plants at Tientsin, Taiyuan, and T'ung-chou, and ordnance plants at Taiyuan and Chin-yüan. This list of major constructions is, of course, not exhaustive and would be much longer if the many new cotton mills were included. The following

---

[8] Yuan-li Wu, op. cit., pp. 265-69.

256 information, it appears that relatively little effort has been made in the last few years to establish new facilities. In fact, a considerable portion of the available plants remained idle for some time during the first few years of the Communist regime as a result of marketing difficulties. Some of the mills have been turning out flour from coarse grains instead of wheat flour. However, as the urban population increases, the demand for flour from modern mills will undoubtedly grow.

V. CONCLUSION

•471 433 178 The above review serves to point out that North China is being intensively developed industrially on the basis of the region's resources of coal, iron, salt, and cotton and on the industrial base established by pre-Communist government and private enterprises. This development, owing much to the Communists' political motivation, has apparently been ruthlessly pursued. However, as far as the heavy industries are concerned, neither regional self-sufficiency nor a high level of output in the absolute sense are in sight. This is true especially in the case of the metallurgical and machinery industries.

Whatever industrial developments the Communists have been able to carry out have taken place under strict government control and within the general framework of national planning. There is, of course, no separate planning system for

471 the North China region as such. As for the gra-
433 dual process of socialization, its application in
178 North China is discussed in the following
chapter.

1;Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
~~AF12~~ AF 12

474 recently available report, there were over 30,000 supply and marketing co-operatives in China in August 1955, with a total membership of 156 million, including 1 million staff members, and some 200,000 retail purchasing agencies.[42] According to Cheng Tzŭ-hua, director of the National Supply and Marketing Co-operative, the retail sales of the co-operatives will increase to 34.1 per cent of the total retail trade under the Communist's first Five-Year Plan.[43] The exact number of supply and marketing co-operatives in North China is not available, but if we calculate on the basis of the ratio of regional population to the population of China as a whole, there were approximately 3,000 co-operatives in the rural districts of North China at the end of 1955.

C. "State Capitalism"

• 471 The principal type of "state capitalism" are three: (1) The state trading companies or the supply and marketing co-operatives may designate private commercial firms as distributors for their products on a commission basis. (2) Private merchants may purchase commodities from state trading companies at wholesale prices for sale to consumers at retail prices fixed by the state. (3) Joint state-private ownership may replace private

42. New China News Agency release, Aug. 3, 1955.

43. Ibid.

1:Stanford U. S-4; 5 1956 AF12 North China
~~AF12~~ AF 12

•471 ownership and the state invest capital in trading firms under joint management. In cities as large as Peking and Tientsin, approximately 70 per cent of the privately-owned commercial firms had undergone "socialist transformation" to one or another form of "state capitalism" by October 1954, according to a Communist report.[44]

D. Private Ownership

The government policy toward private trading corporations and dealers is to utilize their "positive" merits and to restrict their "negative" features by leading them, allegedly at their own insistence, on the road to state capitalism. In view of the monopolistic tendency of the state-owned trading companies, it is obvious that private wholesale and retail dealers will be automatically forced out of business or compelled to act as distributing agents for the state trading firms. Once the Communists had enforced their policy of planned purchase and planned marketing of grains, edible oils, and cotton cloth, the majority of retail dealers in Peking were forced to accept "socialist transformation"

44. Ta-kung Daily, Tientsin, Oct. 4, 1954.

1;Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
~~AF12~~ AF 12

471 to state capitalism. According to a report from Peking, in July 1955 some 40 mills were entirely devoted to state needs, 152 milling houses were engaged to mill and sell grain for the state, and 52 firms were selling grain only on behalf of state agencies.[45]

The majority of dealers engaged in the retailing of cotton cloth and silk in Peking suffered steadily growing losses until government directives forced their merger under a single management. Over thirty textile houses have merged, and others are preparing to follow the Communist-imposed pattern in order to maintain existence.[46]

XIII. FOOD RATIONING

434 Grain was first rationed in Communist China on November 19, 1953, in accordance with a government order for the enforcement of "planned purchase and planned supply of grain," designed to "stabilize foods required for livelihood and national construction,

---

45. Industry and Commerce, Peking, July 10, 1955, p. 30

46. Ibid.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5.1956 AF12 North China
~~AF12~~ AF12

434 The stringent ration of wheat flour, as fixed by the Communists in North China, is evidently insufficient to maintain a normal diet. In spite of the claim that higher yields of wheat are produced each year, it seems obvious that either this claim is false or a shortage exists only because the Communists have found it necessary to export wheat flour in order to build up their foreign reserves. An inadequate food supply will cause serious unrest and ultimately lower agricultural and industrial production.

• 471 As the result of government monopolies in domestic and foreign trade, most privately owned commercial firms either have been forced out of business or have been forced to accept "socialist transformation." In Tientsin, Peking, Shihchiachuang, and Taiyuan, over 30 per cent of the private merchants were unemployed during 1955 and the remainder were forced to accept what work they found available or operate at a loss. The growing employment problem in the cities of the North China Region demands immediate action, and measures like the Back-to-the-Villages Campaign have not met with popular support. Disaffection in the rural areas and discontent in the cities may swell opposition to the ranks of anti-Communists.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China AF12

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3f,
Economic Background

SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF PRIVATE COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY[1]

• 471 Industry in North China developed in three cities in Hopei Province -- Tientsin, Tangshan, and Peking. Before World War II, Tientsin was the second largest center of light industry in China. The Kailan mine, located in the vicinity of Tangshan and producing at one time at least one-quarter of the coal output of China (excluding Manchuria), fostered the growth of industry in this city. Peking, long famous for its handicrafts, became known as an industrial center after the Shih-ching-shan ironworks was established in its suburbs.

Nearly half of the industrial enterprises existing in Tientsin at the conclusion of World War II was expanded by the Japanese during their occupation of North China. Especially prominent were oil-refining companies, steel companies, and factories devoted to the manufacture of electrical products. The Shih-ching-shan ironworks was also completed by the Japanese before their defeat. After the victory, Japanese-built industries were confiscated by the Nationalist Govern-

---

1. Unless otherwise indicated, specific information used in this chapter is based on private information known to Dr. K. N. Chang, the author.

471 ment and by the local governments; therefore, at the time the Communists assumed control of Tientsin, state-controlled industry accounted for approximately 40 per cent of the industrial output of this city.[2]

316 North China's coal mining industry was first
472 developed in Shansi Province, which is considered to have the richest coal reserves in China. Small native iron smelters were scattered throughout the province. Two private coal mining Companies, Chin-pei in North Shansi and Pao-ch'ing in Central Shansi, were of greatest importance to the region's coal mining industry, but smaller companies were of only slightly lesser importance.

473 Before the Sino-Japanese war, the governor of Shansi organized a provincial enterprise called the Northwest Company as part of a program to encourage the general industrial development of the province and bolster the provincial economy. It was operated as a holding company and acquired interests in the two privately owned coal mining companies. The Northwest Company also erected two iron and steel works, one in Central Shansi (Yang-ch'üan) and the other in Taiyuan, the provincial capital, and began to operate several other light industries.

During the period of Japanese occupation, a number of new light industries were encouraged

---

2. Ta-kung Pao [Ta-kung Daily] , Hong Kong, July 15, 1955.

473 by the Japanese, who also assumed control of the interests of the Northwest Company and expanded its various holdings. After World War II, all the industries taken over or erected by the Japanese were surrendered to the provincial government. As a result, all the key industries and most of the light industries in Shansi Province were under the control of the provincial government before the area was overrun by the Communists.

• 471 In addition to assuming control of all the industries in North China owned by the provincial and local governments, the Communists gained control of those industries in which shares were held by so-called "bureaucratic capitalists and war criminals" and by those who had co-operated with the Japanese during the war. As elsewhere, the Communists attempted to eliminate foreign control of foreign-owned enterprises. The Communist authorities had so much to do in the early stages of occupation in determing the policies of a great number of industries that they could not afford to interfere in private industry. But they soon penetrated many industrial enterprises which had investments or credits from banks which were either wholly or partially controlled by the government. For instance, government influence could be exerted on the Pei-yang cotton textile mill, and the Yung-li chemical industries and the Chiu-ta Salt Refinery in Tientsin because the Chin-ch'eng Banking Corporation had interests in each of these industries, and the banking corporation was under the control of the Commu-

471 nist regime. Need for new credits, dependence on government trading organizations for the supply of raw materials and the granting of orders for repurchasing, processing, and finishing increased government influence in private industry.

Meanwhile, the Communists did not cease their plans for the "socialist transformation" of private industry. Little by little, privately owned firms were converted to joint state-private enterprises. To achieve this result, the Communists shrewdly arranged that the move from private to public industry should appear to be the "voluntary" suggestion of private ownership. A few prominent industrialists were chosen to "co-operate" with the government. They were praised as "progressive elements" of an otherwise backward economy and were induced to accept high positions in various government bureaus or in Communist-controlled political groups. Many industrialists, scarcely in a position to do otherwise, expressed their sympathy with the Communist cause. Some may have been under the illusion that tactics of this kind would enable them to obtain additional favors from the new regime; others, because they hoped thereby to protect their own interests, failing to realize that they were to be used as bait to induce fellow industrialists to enter a similar trap.

Li Chu-ch'en, manager of the Yung-li chemical industries and the Chiu-ta Salt Refinery in Tien-

471 tsin and Chou Shu-t'ao, general manager of the Ch'i-hsin Cement Works and the Hua-hsin Cotton Textile Mill in Tangshan, were appointed members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949. In 1950, Li was nominated as a member of the committee of the Central People's Government and Chou became a member of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Central People's Government as well as deputy-mayor of Tientsin municipality. Both were named in 1954 as members of the presidium of the national committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Li was elected as a member of the National Congress standing committee and vice-chairman of the Tientsin municipal committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Chou remains a deputy-mayor of Tientsin.

The Chiu-ta Salt Refinery and the Yung-li chemical industries which had been regarded as the most modern chemical industrial enterprises ever to be created in Tientsin, thus became spearheads of the "socialist transformation" of private industry in North China. The salt refinery was reorganized as a joint state-private concern in 1951, and the chemical industries were reorganized in 1952. Both concerns had had many difficulties during the early days of the regime because they were unable to elicit financial support from the banks. Upon their reorganization, they were able to obtain suffi-

1:Stanford U. S-4 5 1956 AF12 North China AF12

471 cient credits from the People's Bank to expand operations and increase production and they began to pay dividends to their shareholders.

Some industrialists conceived the mistaken notion that the Communists were attempting to aid them in the revitalization of private enterprise This belief was instantly dispelled by a statement issued at the National Congress of Industry and Commerce in 1953. In effect, the Central People's Government planned to place on the road to "state capitalism" all those industries which would be of benefit to the national economy. The Communists asserted that the number of capitalists who understood the "fine points" of "state capitalism" had increased and that the capitalists in fact, were demanding that the government enforce its policy. Not long after the conference the Ch'i-hsin Cement Works and the Hua-hsin Cotton Textile Mill were "transformed" into joint state-private enterprises.

Some 23 joint enterprises in Tientsin were formed during 1953, and 55 private industries were transformed during 1954. These included all privately-owned cotton textile mills and a majority of important factories in otherfields.[3] By the fourth quarter of 1955 the total number of joint state-private industrial enterprises had reached 214, representing 28 per cent of the

---

3. New China News Agency, Tientsin. Dec. 31 1954.

471 total value of local industrial production in some 29 different trades.[4]

In Peking, few large private industries remained. Most had been taken over by the government in 1949. When the Communists embarked on the transformation of private industry in 1954, the remaining enterprises including the 280-year old drugstore called T'ung-jen-t'ang, the famous candy shop Tao-hsiang-ts'un, and three renowned restaurants were among the approximately 290 enterprises which were transformed into joint state-private concerns. It can be inferred that the process of "socialist transformation" in Peking affected the smallest as well as the largest private enterprises.

Because all heavy industry and most light industry in Shansi Province had been taken over by the government, very few enterprises were left in the hands of private interests. In a report on Taiyuan made by the Communist regime, it was stated that state-owned enterprises accounted for 85.58 per cent of the annual revenue co-operatively owned enterprises accounted for 1.12 per cent, and joint public-private enterprises accounted for the balance of the gross industrial output.[5] In 1954, however some twenty enterprises were forced to accept trans-

---

4. New China News Agency, Peking, Sept. 20 1955.

5. Shan-hsi Jih-pao [Shansi Daily], Taiyuan, Dec. 25 1954.

471 formation to joint state-private enterprises. They included six small iron works and two small coal mines.

After the establishment of government trading organizations in major cities to handle the sale of food, textiles, coal, salt, metal and miscellaneous goods supplemented by the establishment of supply-marketing co-operatives the greatest proportion of wholesale business and a slightly smaller proportion of retail business were taken away from the private merchants.

471 443 According to a Communist report[6] in August 1955, state and co-operative trade in Tientsin accounted for 91 per cent of the total wholesale trade. Retail trade by stores operating under various forms of "state capitalism" made up one-third of the total volume of retail trade. Most of Tientsin's 4 600 private wholesalers were forced to go through the process of socialist transformation. Some turned to industrial enterprises, and others have agreed to act as wholesale agents for state-controlled concerns. More than 7,000 employees were trained to work in state trading agencies. More than 60 per cent of the city's private retailers were brought within the sphere of "state capitalism". In Peking, in addition to 59 state department stores and 1,195 supply-marketing co-operat-

---

6. New China News Agency, Tientsin August 10, 1955.

471 443 tives[7] already in existence in 1944, a large department store capable of catering to 20,000 customers was completed in 1955.

The Communist regime maintained almost complete control of all wholesale business by means of government trading organizations established in Shansi Province. Private retail business has been encroached upon by the supply-marketing co-operatives and by the great number of small state-owned department stores scattered throughout the province.

It can be said that private commerce in North China has been liquidated rather than transformed.

---

7. New China News Agency, Peking, Dec. 29, 1954.

2 Gamble S-5 (1928-1933) 1954 AF12 North China AF12

162 there were more males in the 21–30 year group than in the 1–10 year group. We cannot determine whether this unusually large proportion in the 11–20 year group was the result of an incomplete report or represented an unusual age distribution in these families. Part of the difference, undoubtedly, is due to the fact that the 1–10 year group, Chinese count, covers an average of only nine and one-half instead of ten years. Our 5,255 and 575 family groups did not show the same unusual age distribution.

It will be noted that 54.3 per cent of those over 50 years of age were females. The females outnumbered the males in all the groups over 60 years of age and as there were only three more males than females in the 51–60 group, the females probably outnumbered the males after the age of 55.

The field reports listed 457 males and 44 females as "able to recognize characters". Thirty-four per cent of the males, but only 3.7 per cent of the females, had had some education. For the entire group, the proportion was 19.8 per cent. It was 24 per cent of those over 10 years of age.

Farm Capital

• 471 The capital value of the farm property owned by the 400 families, including land, houses, implements, animals, trees, seed, and fodder, totaled $1,020,900, an average of $2,552 per farm. For the owners, the average was $3,320. It was $1,538 for the part-owners, but only $152 for the tenants. (See Table 19.) The difference in these figures is largely due, of course, to the fact that the tenants included nothing for land owned and the part-owners included the value of only two-thirds of the land they used. Land value represented 82 per cent of the total reported capital. If the land is omitted, the average capital amounts were owners $569, part-owners $306, and tenants $152.

The larger size of the farms of the owners and part-owners was partly responsible for the difference in these figures, as our study showed that the amount of capital, other than land, was generally related to the size of the farms, though the owners' figures were usually larger than the part-owners', and the part-owners' larger than the tenants'. The averages per mu for the three ownership groups were owners $16.00, part-owners $12.20, and tenants $10.65. In all three groups, the highest amount per mu was in the 1–10 mu group, largely because of a high per mu value of the houses. If both house and land are omitted, the capital

2. Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 AF12 North China AF12

471

per mu was $6.35 for the owners, $4.55 for the part-owners, and $2.95 for the tenants.

Along with the averages for the three ownership groups, the detailed figures of the 1–10, the 21–30, and the over 100 mu owner groups are given in Table 19 to illustrate the variations in the land value and other capital items of the different sized farms.

The total value of land, buildings, and equipment of the individual owners ranged from less than $500 to over $10,000. It did not go above $6,500 for any of the part-owners and was less than $500 for all of the tenant families. Sixteen owner families reported capital of more than $10,000. This was one more than the number of families with over 100 mu of land. Almost one-half, 48 per cent, of the owners reported capital of over $2,500, but only 15 per cent of the part-owners had more than that amount. In both the owner and part-owner groups, the largest number of families had from $501 to $1,000 of capital. Fifty-eight per cent of the entire group of 400 families had not more than $2,000 of capital. The fact that none of the tenant families reported more than $500 of capital is indicative of their financial status and of many of their problems and relationships. (See Table 20.)

The total land value of $889,010, shown in Table 21, includes the value of the rented land as well as that of the land owned. While the average value for the 12,377 mu was $71.80 per mu, the land owned by the operators averaged $76.60 and the rented land $35.30 per mu. The value of the rented land would seem to have been underestimated for the gross return per mu in the 1–10 and 11–20 mu groups was larger for the tenants than for either the owners or the part-owners.

The reports do not give any totals for irrigated and unirrigated land, but, judging from the value figures, probably at least two-thirds of the area had water available. The Chai Ch'eng families had an average of more than one well per family.

The average value of the farm houses was $280, but the amounts for the different ownership groups and the different sized farms varied from $75.80 for the tenants with 1–10 mu to $1,200 for the owners with over 100 mu.

How the average house value increased with the size of the farm is shown in Table 22. The figures given there are for all the families regardless of ownership classification.

While the value of the house increased with the size of the farm, it

2: Gamble S-3 (1926-1933) 1954 AAF12 North China AF12

471 did not correlate closely with the amount of land farmed. The average was $9.05 per mu, but for the different sized farm groups the amount varied from $7.25 per mu for the 11–20 mu group to just twice that amount, $14.50, for the 1–10 mu group. The latter figure was unusually high because $100, the average house value for that group, was probably close to the minimum needed to provide a room for the family and a place for farm tools and produce. For the groups with the larger farms, the value of the house usually increased more rapidly than the size of the farm. It was $9.75 per mu in the over 100 mu group. The house value did not, however, represent an increasing proportion of the farm capital. It averaged 10.4 per cent for the owners, 12.4 for the part-owners, and 72.1 for the tenants.

The field reports did not include figures on the size of the houses, but for the 34 families included in our family budget study (see Chapter V), the average house had 6.7 chien and was valued at $360. The residence area of the families in the Experimental District averaged 1.13 mu per family, a plot about 80 by 100 feet. The reports did not state how many of the 400 families owned their homes, but other studies showed that home ownership in Ting Hsien was almost universal.

The farm implements were valued at $39.15 per farm. For the three ownership groups the averages ranged from $31.35 for the part-owners to $45.60 for the owners. As the size of the farm increased the average value of the implements increased from $9.00 for the 1–10 mu group to $35.77 for the 21–30 mu group and to $119.20 for the families with more than 100 mu. This was a wide range, but the figures per mu showed that the amount of equipment owned was closely related to the size of the farm. For the different sized farm groups the amounts varied from $0.95 to $1.55 per mu. The average was $1.25 per mu. The amount per mu was smallest for the tenants and largest for the owners. (See Table 22.)

The cost of different types of farm implements varied from 10 cents for a sheng measure to $100 for a Persian water wheel. Brooms, made from locally grown broom plants, cost from 10 to 30 cents. Wooden forks, made by steaming a tree crotch with three limbs and then tying it to a ladder to shape it, cost from 70 to 80 cents, a flail from $4.00 to $5.00. Peanut sifters were listed as costing $8.00 to $9.00, but not many of the farmers owned them as they could be rented for 40 cents per day. (See Table 23.)

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 AF12 North China AF12

471

The farm animals reported included 36.3 horses, 76 cows, 109.5 mules, and 135.6 donkeys. These were all used as draft animals. The fractional figures for donkeys, mules, and horses are correct, for 56 families reported that they owned one-half or one-third of an animal. Three hundred and thirty-four farms, 83.5 per cent, had at least a fraction of a draft animal. Ninety-five per cent of the families in the 21–30 mu group and all of the families with more than 30 mu owned at least part of a draft animal. Thirty per cent of the families with 20 mu or less and 63 per cent of the families with 1–10 mu had none. We wonder how 21 families in the 1–10 mu group managed to support a family and even a part of a donkey on a farm of less than 1.6 acres. More than one animal was reported by 9.4 per cent of the owners and 4.5 per cent of the part-owners. We do not have the details of how the families who owned shares in a draft animal divided its work, the cost of its upkeep, and its care, but we can imagine some of the difficulties and arguments that could arise.

Eighty-one per cent of the families had pigs and 84 per cent had chickens. Generally from 90 to 100 per cent of the families with more than 20 mu had pigs. The proportion was 71 per cent for the families with 11–20 mu and 45 per cent for the families with 1–10 mu. Of the tenant families with 1–10 mu only 18 per cent kept a pig. The families with pigs had an average of 1.6 animals per family. The owners with more than 50 mu and the part-owners with from 31 to 50 mu averaged more than two pigs per family, but the part-owners in the 51–100 mu group had 1.5 pigs per family.

Ninety-two per cent of the families with more than 20 mu kept some chickens. In the 1–10 mu group 58 per cent had some fowl The average number was 4.6 for the families keeping chickens. In the different sized farm groups the average ranged from 1.9 for the 1–10 mu owners to 6.9 for the over 100 mu owners. One tenant family with 36 mu had 13 birds.

Only 13 families, 3 per cent, had ducks and smaller numbers of families kept geese, sheep, and rabbits. (See Table 24.)

The average value of the farm animals was $50.40 per farm. For the owners the average increased from $8.15 for the 1–10 mu group to $42.20 for the 21–30 mu group and $238.45 for the over 100 mu group. For the part-owners the average varied from $6.60 to $91.60. The value per mu for the owner groups ranged from $1.20 to $1.95, with the av-

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 AF12 North China AF12

erage $1.71 per mu. For the part-owners and tenants the averages were somewhat smaller. (See Table 22.)

Trees on the farms and around the houses were estimated to be worth $30,125. Five-sixths of this amount was reported by the owners. Only $100 was reported by all the tenants. For the owners the average was $102.35 per farm. It was $20.60 for the 1–10 mu owner group and $144.85 for the 51–100 mu group. There was a big increase in the over 100 mu group, where the average was $404.15. All of the owner groups had an average of over $100 except the two with 20 or less mu. For the part-owners the averages were less than $75 for all groups and only $8.40 for the 1–10 mu group. For the tenants the averages were all less than $6.25, except for the 31–40 mu group. The one family in that group reported that it had $20 worth of trees. All the tenants' trees, of course, were around their houses in the villages.

Seed that was on hand and reported as farm capital averaged $8.75 per farm but was very largely an owner and part-owner item: $10.15 for the owners, $7.30 for the part-owners, but only $1.80 for the tenants. The amount for fodder was just half that for seed with none reported by the tenants. Fertilizer was such a small item that the 400 families reported a total of only $15.40 on hand.

Farm Income

Eighteen different crops were grown on the 400 farms. The total estimated value of the annual crop yield was $139,235, an average of $348.00 per farm. The average per mu was $11.25.

The average crop yield per mu shows a very consistent agreement for the different ownership groups and for the different sized farm groups. For the three ownership groups the difference in the averages was only 25 cents. The amounts were tenants $11.10, owners $11.20, and part-owners $11.35. There was a slightly wider range in the different sized farm groups. There, except for the tenant groups with only one family, the variation was from $10.60 to $12.35. For the owners the range was from $10.70 in the over 100 mu group to $12.35 in the 21–30 mu group. The average did not show any tendency to increase as the size of the farm increased. For the owners the 1–10 mu and the 41–50 mu averages were the same and they were only five cents more than the over 100 mu average.

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 AF 12 North China AF 12

162

TABLE 18. AGE AND SEX

Age[1]	Males	Females	Total	Per Cent	Average Family[2]
10 and under	245	204	449	17.7	1.1
11–20	286	243	529	20.8	1.3
21–30	248	191	439	17.3	1.1
31–40	201	159	360	14.2	0.9
41–50	171	158	329	13.0	0.8
51–60	119	116	235	9.3	0.6
61–70	53	73	126	5.0	0.3
71–80	22	34	56	2.2	0.2
Over 80	3	10	13	0.5	–
	1,348	1,188	2,536	100.0	6.3

[1] Chinese age.
[2] 64 year-round workers included.

471

TABLE 19. VALUE OF CAPITAL ASSETS

	Owner				Part-owner	Tenant
	1–10 Mu	21–30 Mu	Over 100 Mu	Average	Average	Average
Land	$464	$2,002	$9,821	$2,751	$1,232	–
House	111	216	1,200	345	191	$109
Implements	9	40	119	46	31	15
Animals	8	42	238	61	37	21
Trees	21	101	404	102	37	5
Seeds	1	8	38	10	7	2
Fodder	–	4	22	5	5	–
	$614	$2,413	$11,842	$3,320	$1,538	$152
Average value per mu of land owned				$77.50	$73.95	

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 ?. AF12 North China AF12

471

TABLE 20. CAPITAL PER FARM
(percentages)

	Owners	*Part-owners*	*Tenants*	*Total*
$ 500 and under	6.2	13.3	100	13.5
501–1,000	14.3	31.1		19.2
1,001–1,500	12.3	17.1		13.2
1,501–2,000	11.9	13.3		11.8
2,001–2,500	7.4	10.4		8.0
2,501–3,000	7.0	7.5		6.8
3,001–4,000	11.9	4.5		8.8
4,001–5,000	10.6	1.4		7.0
5,001–7,500	10.6	1.4		7.0
7,501–10,000	1.2			0.7
Over 10,000	6.6			4.0
	100.0	100.0	100	100.0

435

TABLE 21. LAND VALUE

	Area (mu)	*Per Cent*	*Total Value*	*Per Cent*	*Per Mu*
Under $40 per mu	1,295	10.5	$ 35,190	4.0	$27.20
$40–$79	4,972	40.2	300,650	33.8	60.50
$80 and over	6,110	49.3	553,170	62.2	90.50
	12,377	100.0	$889,010	100.0	$71.80

TABLE 22. VALUE OF FARM HOUSES AND IMPLEMENTS

Size of	*Houses*		*Implements*		*Animals*	
Farm (mu)	*Per Farm*	*Per Mu*	*Per Farm*	*Per Mu*	*Per Farm*	*Per Mu*
1–10	$ 100	$14.50	$ 9.00	$1.30	$ 6.10	$0.88
11–20	110	7.25	19.00	1.25	27.22	1.80
21–30	205	8.00	35.75	1.40	39.50	1.55
31–40	255	7.35	52.95	1.55	48.01	1.40
41–50	345	7.80	65.85	1.50	69.15	1.55
51–100	620	9.70	74.85	1.15	111.42	1.75
Over 100	1,200	9.75	119.20	.95	238.45	1.95
Average	280	9.05	39.15	1.25	50.40	1.65
Owners		9.75		1.28		1.71
Part-owners		7.55		1.24		1.45
Tenants		7.65		1.02		1.49

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 AF12 North China AF12

that did not have one or more members working on cotton, ginning, beating, spinning, or weaving. This was only 1.5 per cent of the home industry families in the five villages. Only 12 females and 72 males in those villages were non-cotton workers, 0.6 per cent of the female workers and 5.4 per cent of the male workers. If the families in the mat weaving village are included, 80 per cent of the workers in the 1,220 families were working on cotton.

More than one industry was reported by 27 per cent of the families. There were 321 with two industries and eight with three. Ginning, spinning, and weaving was one series. Spinning, weaving leg bands, and making brooms was another.

Two kinds of work were reported by 10.5 per cent of the female workers but only 1.1 per cent of the males. None reported more than two. Spinning and weaving covered all the duplications for the 10 males and all but four of 210 duplications for the females.

The villages show an interesting concentration of industry. One village had only mat weaving. Some thread was spun in that village but it was all used in binding the mats so was not listed as a separate activity. All the bags were woven in one village. All but two of the 124 families weaving belts and leg bands lived in one village. Two-thirds of the industries reported were found in only one of the six villages. Bean curd making, cotton ginning and spinning, and cloth weaving were the only industries reported by five villages.

The items covered in our study of the 1,220 families made it possible to relate the family's land holdings to the size of the family, sex distribution, number of workers, and the proportion of the males and females working. The figures are given in Table 33.

Small land holdings were the rule. Eleven per cent of the families had no land and 82.2 per cent had less than 25 mu. Less than 1.0 per cent had 100 or more mu. As the amount of land held by the family increased the size of the average family generally increased. It was 4.1 persons for the landless families and 14.1 persons for those with 75–99 mu. As mentioned above the proportion of males decreased as the amount of land and the size of the family increased.

The average number of male workers per family did not change appreciably except in the highest group. Generally it was about 1.0 per family. In the 100 mu group, however, the average was only 0.1 male worker per family. For the females the average number of workers per

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 AF 12 North China AF 12

423
427

TABLE 59. LARGEST FARM HOLDING, 453 VILLAGES[1]

Mu	*Villages*	*Per Cent*	*Mu*	*Villages*	*Per Cent*
Under 50	7	1.6	300–349	31	6.8
50–99	81	17.9	350–399	22	4.9
100–149	126	27.8	400–499	16	3.5
150–199	83	18.3	500–999	14	3.1
200–249	42	9.3	1,000–1,499	1[2]	0.2
250–299	29	6.4	1,500 and over	1[3]	0.2
				453	100.0

[1] Largest holding in city, 3,950 mu. [2] 1,150. [3] 1,800.

TABLE 60. SIZE OF FARMS PRIVATELY OWNED

Area	*Number*	*Per Cent*	*Mu*	*Per Cent*	*Average*
Under 25 mu	46,447	72.0	468,940	33.1	10.1
25–49	12,288	19.0	401,230	28.3	32.7
50–99	4,460	6.9	304,830	21.5	68.1
100–299	1,223	1.9	180,280	12.7	147.0
300 and over	132	0.2	61,580	4.4	466.0
Total or average	64,550	100.0	1,416,860	100.0	22.0

TABLE 61. VALUE OF FARM LAND

471
423

Value per Mu	*Total Mu*	*Per Cent*
Under $25	149,160	10.5
25–49	344,320	24.3
50–74	399,340	28.2
75–99	307,190	21.7
100–124	169,010	11.9
125–149	39,580	2.8
150 and over	8,260	0.6
	1,416,860[1]	100.0

[1] Publicly owned land omitted.